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Article 80 of the Rules of the 
International Court of Justice 
(1) The Court may entertain a counter-claim only if it comes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court and is directly connected with the subject-matter of 
the claim of the other party. 
(2) A counter-claim shall be made in the Counter-Memorial and shall appear as 
part of the submissions contained therein. The right of the other party to 
present its views in writing on the counter-claim, in an additional pleading, 
shall be preserved, irrespective of any decision of the Court, in accordance 
with Article 45, paragraph 2, of these Rules, concerning the filing of further 
written pleadings. 
(3) Where an objection is raised concerning the application of paragraph 1 or 
whenever the Court deems necessary, the Court shall take its decision thereon 
after hearing the parties. 
(1) La Cour ne peut connaître d’une demande reconventionnelle que si celle-ci 
relève de sa compétence et est en connexité directe avec l’objet de la demande 
de la partie adverse. 
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(2) La demande reconventionnelle est présentée dans le contre-mémoire et figure 
parmi les conclusions contenues dans celui-ci. Le droit qu’a l’autre partie 
d’exprimer ses vues par écrit sur la demande reconventionnelle dans une pièce 
de procédure additionnelle est préservé, indépendamment de toute décision 
prise par la Cour, conformément au paragraphe 2 de l’article 45 du présent 
Règlement, quant au dépôt de nouvelles pièces de procédure. 
(3) En cas d’objection relative à l’application du paragraphe 1 ou à tout moment 
lorsque la Cour le considère nécessaire, la Cour prend sa décision à cet égard 
après avoir entendu les parties. 
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A. Introduction 
 1 A ‘counter-claim’ is ‘an autonomous legal act’ by the respondent in a conten-
tious case before the Court, ‘the object of which is to submit a new claim to the Court’, one 
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that is ‘linked to the principal claim, in so far as, formulated as a “counter” claim, it reacts to’ 
the principal claim.1 A counter-claim is not a defence on the merits to the principal claim;2 
while it is a reaction to that claim, it is pursuing objectives other than simply dismissal of the 
principal claim.3 Hence, the reason for allowing a counter-claim to be included as part of an 
existing case is not because it assists in disposition of the principal claim but, rather, to assist 
in the disposition of two autonomous claims.4 The counter-claim is allowed to become a part 
of an existing case ‘in order to ensure better administration of justice, given the specific na-
ture of the claims in question’ and ‘to achieve a procedural economy whilst enabling the 
Court to have an overview of the respective claims of the parties and to decide them more 
consistently’.5 
 2 The ICJ Statute does not directly address the issue of the respondent filing a 
counter-claim against the applicant. Article 80 of the Rules, however, provides that the Court 
may entertain such a counter-claim in certain circumstances, as a part of the incidental pro-
                                                 
1 Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 243, 
256, para. 27; Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area and Construction of 
a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River, Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, ICJ Re-
ports (2013), pp. 200, 208, para. 19; Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in 
the Caribbean Sea, Counter-Claims, Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports (2017), para. 18; 
Kolb, ICJ, pp. 659-60. 
2 See Rosenne, Leiden JIL (2001), p. 85. 
3 Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 243, 256, para. 27; see Anzilotti, 
JDI (1930), pp. 867 et seq.; Salerno, RGDIP (1999), pp. 333 et seq.; Quintana, ICJ Litigation, p. 
811. 
4 Anzilotti, JDI (1930), pp. 874 et seq. 
5 Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 243, 257, para. 30; see Genet, Rev. 
de droit intern. et de lég. comp. (1938), p. 148; Antonopoulos (2011), pp. 57 et seq. 
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ceedings of an existing case. The Court’s establishment of this rule is generally predicated on 
its authority under Art. 48 of the Statute to ‘make orders for the conduct of the case’. 
 3 Counter-claims featured somewhat in the early life of the Court (in 1950–
1952), but then disappeared for several decades, only re-emerging in several cases after 1997. 
Renewed interest in the use of counter-claims may be due to a desire by respondents to pre-
sent to the Court a more balanced perspective of the conduct of the two States before it, since 
inclusion of the counter-claim may force both the Court and the other party to confront cer-
tain facts and legal arguments that otherwise would not feature in the case. From the Court’s 
perspective, allowing a counter-claim in the proper circumstances promotes the value of judi-
cial economy,6 since addressing the claim and counter-claim in a single proceeding may be 
more efficient than doing so in separate cases. At the same time, there are requirements that 
must be met before a counter-claim may be entertained, requirements designed to prevent a 
respondent from using an unrelated counter-claim simply as a tactic for slowing down the 
disposition of principal claim and for detracting from a central focus on that claim. 
 4 In the normal course of any respondent defending against a claim, the re-
spondent will assert a factual and legal position that ‘counters’ the position of the applicant. 
Advancement of that position, however, is not regarded as a ‘counter-claim’ within the mean-
ing of Art. 80 of the Rules, and does not implicate the requirements and procedures discussed 
later.7 Indeed, the relatively limited practice of counter-claims may be because the Court, 
when rejecting any claim on the merits, concomitantly accepts the position of the respondent 
in much the same way as it would if a closely-related counter-claim had been filed.8 A coun-
                                                 
6 See Rosenne, Leiden JIL (2001), p. 87. 
7 Genet, Rev. de droit intern. et de lég. comp. (1938), pp. 145 et seq. 
8 See e.g. Case Concerning the Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1991), pp. 53, 
75–6, para. 69 (3) (rejecting the applicant’s position that the award was not binding and instead 
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ter-claim only arises before the Court as part of a formal step taken by the respondent. That 
step changes the possibilities of the case, for it invites the Court to issue a judgment directed 
against the applicant, opening the door to a remedy against the very State that initiated the 
case.9 
B. Historical Development of the Counter-Claims Rule  
I. Permanent Court of International Justice 
 5 Like the ICJ Statute, the Statute of the PCIJ did not address the issue of coun-
ter-claims. Article 40 of the 1922 Rules of Court of the PCIJ, however, envisaged the possi-
bility of counter-claims being filed as a part of a respondent’s responsive pleading, insofar as 
they ‘come within the jurisdiction of the Court’,10 but provided no particular guidance on 
how such counter-claims should proceed. This initial and very cursory reference to counter-
claims was not changed in the Rules of Court adopted in 1926 and 1931.11 The issue was 
much further developed in Art. 63 of the 1936 Rules of the Court, which provided that coun-
ter-claims were limited to cases initiated by a unilateral application, must be filed with the 
Counter-Memorial, and must be ‘directly connected’ to the subject-matter of the applica-
tion.12 
 6 Counter-claims arose before the PCIJ in three cases.13 In Factory at Chorzów, 
Poland filed a document that it titled a ‘counter-claim’. The Court regarded Poland’s submis-
                                                                                                                                                        
finding that the award was binding and must be applied by, inter alia, the applicant). 
9 Anzilotti, JDI (1930), pp. 874 et seq. 
10 Rules of Court, adopted on 24 March 1922, PCIJ, Series D, No. 2, Art. 40. 
11 Guyomar, Commentaire, p. 519. 
12 Rules of Court, adopted on 11 March 1936, PCIJ, Series D, third addendum to No. 2, 3rd edn., Art. 
63; Guyomar, Commentaire, p. 522. 
13 For an analysis of the practice of the PCIJ, see Antonopoulos (2011), pp. 37–47. 
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sion as juridically connected to Germany’s claim (indeed, the concept of ‘direct connection’ 
identified here influenced the later crafting of Art. 63 of the 1936 Rules), but the Court 
viewed Poland’s submission as simply an effort to offset the amount of compensation that 
might be paid to Germany. The Court assumed jurisdiction over Poland’s submission by vir-
tue of its jurisdiction over Germany’s claim, but rejected the submission in the course of de-
ciding in favour of Germany.14 It should be noted that, since the Rules of Court rather confus-
ingly contemplated a respondent filing a ‘counter-case’, which might include ‘counter-
claims’, it may not have been clear to Poland what was meant by a true counter-claim. 
 7 In Diversion of Water from the Meuse, Belgium filed a counter-claim, over 
which the Court found (without objection from the Netherlands) that it had jurisdiction and 
further found was directly connected to the Netherlands’ claim.15 Nevertheless, on the merits, 
the Court rejected both the claim and counter-claim as unfounded.16 In Panevezys-Saldutiskis 
Railway, Lithuania advanced a counter-claim contingent on the Court finding Estonia’s claim 
admissible, which the Court did not. As such, the Court did not pass upon the counter-
claim.17 
II. International Court of Justice 
 8 The 1946 Rules of Court addressed counter-claims in Art. 63, which generally 
(but not exactly) followed Art. 63 of the PCIJ Rules of Court. Three counter-claims were 
filed under the 1946 formulation of the rule, all in the period 1950–1952. Norway “reserved” 
                                                 
14 Factory at Chorzów, Merits, PCIJ, Series A, No. 17, pp. 34–9, 63–4; see Genet, Rev. de droit in-
tern. et de lég. comp. (1938), pp. 161 et seq.; Anzilotti, JDI (1930), pp. 857 et seq. 
15 Guyomar, Commentaire, p. 522; Genet, Rev. de droit intern. et de lég. comp. (1938), pp. 168 et seq. 
16 Diversion of Water from the Meuse, Judgment, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 70, pp. 4, 28–32. 
17 Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway, Judgment, PCIJ, Series A/B, No. 76, pp. 4, 7–9, 22; see Guyomar, 
Commentaire, p. 522. 
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a counter-claim in 1950 against the United Kingdom in Fisheries case; Peru filed a counter-
claim in 1950 against Colombia in Asylum; and the United States filed a counter-claim in 
1951 against France in Rights of US Nationals in Morocco.18 
 9 The 1972 Rules of Court renumbered the rule on counter-claims as Art. 68, 
but no counter-claims were filed during the period that those rules were in force. The 1978 
Rules of Court revised the text of the article on counter-claims and renumbered it as Art. 80. 
Four cases filed during the time that the 1978 Rules of Court were in force resulted in the 
filing of a counter-claim: Yugoslavia filed counter-claims in 1997 against Bosnia and Herze-
govina in the (Bosnian) Genocide case; the United States filed a counter-claim in 1997 
against Iran in Oil Platforms; Nigeria filed counter-claims in 1999 against Cameroon in Land 
and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria; and Uganda filed counter-claims in 
2001 against the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Armed Activities on the Territory of 
the Congo. 
 10 In 2000, the Court amended Art. 80 of the Rules to its present formulation,19 
which applies to all cases submitted to the Court on or after 1 February 2001. As of 2017, 
four cases have included the filing of a counter-claim under the 2000 amendment: Italy filed 
a counter-claim in 2009 against Germany in Jurisdictional Immunities of the State; Serbia 
filed a counter-claim in 2010 against Croatia in the (Croatian) Genocide case; Nicaragua 
filed four counter-claims in 2012 against Costa Rica in Certain Activities Carried Out by 
Nicaragua in the Border Area; and Colombia in 2016, Colombia filed four counter-claims 
against Nicaragua in Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Car-
ibbean Sea. 
 11 The different versions of the rule address similar issues, but variations in the 
                                                 
18 Guyomar, Commentaire, pp. 522 et seq. 
19 See Rosenne, Leiden JIL (2001), pp. 83 et seq. 
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text mean that decisions reached by the Court in prior cases should be considered in the light 
of the formulation of the rule on counter-claims in existence at that time. Further, some 
changes in the text provide a basis for how best to interpret the rule that is currently in force. 
For example, in the formulations of the rule prior to 1978, the text indicated that a counter-
claim could only be made in cases that began with the filing of an application, which made 
clear that a counter-claim was not envisaged for a case initiated by a joint application of two 
States. The more recent formulations of the rule contain no such requirement. Though it is 
likely that the filing of a joint application by two States would already encompass whatever 
claims the two States wish to bring against each other, it is possible that developments in the 
case subsequent to the filing of the joint application result in one of the States wishing to in-
troduce a new ‘counter-claim’ in response to the other State’s presentation of its claim. The 
change in formulation of the rule would appear to allow such a counter-claim, so long as the 
other requirements of Art. 80 of the Rules are met. 
C. Issues of Interpretation 
 12 As indicated earlier, the Court’s rule on counter-claims has changed somewhat 
over time. Likewise, the application and interpretation of the rule by the Court in several cas-
es has helped to clarify and develop the meaning of the rule. This section addresses the key 
areas where the Court’s jurisprudence has shaped the regime on counter-claims. 
I. Two Requirements for Entertaining the Counter-Claim 
 13 Article 80, para. 1 of the Rules allows the Court to entertain a ‘counter-claim’. 
The Rule does not define what is meant by ‘counter-claim’ or whether that term, by itself, 
imposes certain limitations upon what may be filed. In his dissenting opinion with respect to 
Yugoslavia’s counter-claim in the (Bosnian) Genocide case, Judge Weeramantry insisted that 
the term required that the counter-claim ‘counter’ the principal claim, rather than simply be a 
parallel claim arising from circumstances linked in space and time to the principal claim. For 
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Judge Weeramantry, there ‘must be some point of intersection between the two claims, which 
makes one exert an influence upon the judicial consequence of the other’.20 The counter-
claim might go further than just impinging upon or weakening the principal claim by seeking 
reparation from the applicant, but it still must ‘counter’ the principal claim; a ‘claim that is 
autonomous and has no bearing on the determination of the initial claim does not thus qualify 
as a counter-claim’.21 In the context of that case, Yugoslavia’s counter-claim that Bosnia and 
Herzegovina committed acts of genocide could not possibly diminish, off-set or weaken any 
acts of genocide committed by Yugoslavia and thus, for Judge Weeramantry, Yugoslavia’s 
counter-claim was incapable of ‘countering’ the principal claim.22 
 14 Judge Weeramantry’s view, however, was not adopted by the Court. In that 
and subsequent cases, the Court has not viewed the term ‘counter-claim’ as itself embodying 
particular constraints on the type of claim that may be filed with the Court. Instead, the Court 
has focused on the other language of Art. 80, para. 1 of the Rules, which provides that the 
Court may entertain a counter-claim ‘only if’ two requirements are met: when the counter-
claim ‘comes within the jurisdiction of the Court’ and when the counter-claim is ‘directly 
connected with the subject matter of the claim of the other party’. The Court has character-
ized these two requirements both as requirements on the ‘admissibility of a counter-claim as 
such’, explaining that admissibility ‘in this context must be understood broadly to encompass 
both the jurisdictional requirement and the direct-connection requirement’.23  
                                                 
20 Bosnian Genocide case, Diss. Op. Weeramantry, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 287, 289. 
21 Ibid., p. 291. 
22 Ibid., pp. 292–4; see Thirlway, ICJ Law and Procedure (2013), p. 1011; Quintana, ICJ Litigation, 
pp. 809-10. 
23 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea, Counter-Claims, 
Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports (2017), para. 19; see also Oil Platforms, Counter-Claim, 
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 15 The reason for the first requirement, relating to jurisdiction, is to preclude the 
respondent from using the counter-claim ‘as a means of referring to an international court 
claims which exceed the limits of its jurisdiction as recognized by the parties’.24 The reason 
for the second requirement, relating to ‘direct connection’, is to preclude the respondent from 
using the counter-claim as a means ‘to impose on the Applicant any claim it chooses, at the 
risk of infringing the Applicant’s rights and of compromising the proper administration of 
justice’.25 
 16 The use of ‘may entertain’ rather than ‘shall entertain’ makes clear that ac-
ceptance of the counter-claim as a part of the case, even if the counter-claim meets these two 
requirements, is wholly within the discretion of the Court; it still remains open for the Court 
to decline to address the counter-claim within the proceedings.26 To date, the Court has not 
exercised such discretion; in each instance where it has found both requirements to have been 
met, the Court has allowed the counter-claim to proceed as part of the case. 
 17 The use of the word ‘only’ makes clear that, if either of the two requirements 
is not satisfied, the Court should not entertain the counter-claim. Thus, the requirements are 
                                                                                                                                                        
Order of 10 March 1998, ICJ Reports (1998), pp. 190, 203, para. 33; Armed Activities (DRC v. Ugan-
da), Counter-Claims, Order of 29 November 2001, ICJ Reports (2001), pp. 660, 678, para. 35; Juris-
dictional Immunities of the State, Counter-Claim, Order of 6 July 2010, ICJ Reports (2010), pp. 310, 
315-6, para. 14; Border Area/Construction of a Road, Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, ICJ 
Reports (2013), pp. 200, 208, para. 20. 
24 Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 243, 
257–8, para. 31. 
25 Ibid. 
26 See Shaw, Rosenne’s Law and Practice, vol. III, p. 1271; but see Antonopoulos (2011), p. 74. 
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“cumulative” in nature; both must be satisfied for the counter-claim to be found admissible.27 
Even if the applicant does not object to the counter-claim, it appears that the Court must still 
consider whether the counter-claim meets these two requirements. Thus, in the (Croatian) 
Genocide case, although Croatia indicated that it did not intend to raise objections to the ad-
missibility of Serbia’s counter-claims, that alone did not dispose of the matter. Rather, the 
Court simply stated that it ‘does not consider that it is required to rule definitively at this 
stage on the question of whether the said claims fulfil the conditions set forth in Article 80, 
paragraph 1, of the Rules of Court’.28 In its practice to date, whenever the Court has found 
that one or other of the requirements has not been met, it has declined to allow the counter-
claim to become a part of the case before it. 
 18 In the formulations of the rule prior to 2000, the two key requirements for the 
filing of a counter-claim—that it falls within the jurisdiction of the Court and that it is direct-
ly connected with the subject-matter of the principal claim—were reversed. Nevertheless, in 
the cases before the Court that arose under the prior formulation of the rule, the Court first 
determined whether it had jurisdiction over the counter-claim before proceeding to the issue 
of the connection with the principal claim. The order of the requirements in the current for-
mulation arguably places somewhat greater emphasis on need for the counter-claim to fall 
within the jurisdiction of the Court; in the event that it does not, the question of whether it is 
directly connected to the principal claim becomes irrelevant. Nevertheless, the Court is free 
to analyse the two requirements in whatever sequence it wishes; for example, in Alleged Vio-
lations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea, the Court addressed 
                                                 
27 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea, Counter-Claims, 
Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports (2017), para. 20. 
28 Croatian Genocide case, Order of 4 February 2010, ICJ Reports (2010), pp. 3, 6 (emphasis added). 
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the requirement of direct connection prior to addressing the requirement of jurisdiction.29 
II. Jurisdiction Over the Counter-Claim ‘As Such’ 
 19 As indicated earlier, para. 1 of Art. 80 of the Rules provides that the counter-
claim may be entertained only if it ‘comes within the jurisdiction of the Court’. 
 20 To the extent that the applicant fails to object to the Court’s jurisdiction over 
the counter-claim at any point in the proceeding, the Court typically finds that jurisdiction 
exists with little if any discussion.30 Thus, in Rights of US Nationals in Morocco, France in-
voked the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court to obtain a finding that a treaty concluded 
between the United States and the Emperor of Morocco in September 1936 provided only for 
exemptions from local jurisdiction for US nationals in Morocco in certain limited, specified 
cases. In its Counter-Memorial, the United States maintained by means of a counter-claim 
that it was entitled to more extensive benefits. In its reply, France contested the merits of the 
US position, but did not object to the jurisdiction of the Court over the US counter-claim. The 
Court proceeded to deal with the counter-claim without any discussion of jurisdiction (or, for 
that matter, the connectivity of the counter-claim to the claim).31 Similarly, when Nigeria 
filed its counter-claim against Cameroon, the latter indicated no objection of any kind, and 
the Court found without discussion that jurisdiction existed.32 
                                                 
29 See Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea, Counter-
Claims, Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports (2017), para. 20 (the Court “is not bound by the 
sequence set out in” Article 80). 
30 Murphy, Geo. Wash. Univ. Int’l L. Rev. (2000–2001), p. 17. 
31 U.S. Nationals in Morocco, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1952), pp. 176, 203–12; see Guyomar, Com-
mentaire, p. 524. 
32 Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, Order of 30 June 1999, ICJ Reports 
(1999), pp. 983, 985. 
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 21 The applicant might object to the admissibility of the counter-claim for rea-
sons other than jurisdiction. Thus, in the (Bosnian) Genocide case, Bosnia and Herzegovina 
invoked the compromissory clause of the Genocide Convention against Yugoslavia to ad-
vance its claim that Yugoslavia had committed acts of genocide in violation of the Conven-
tion. Yugoslavia invoked the same basis of jurisdiction to advance its counter-claim that Bos-
nia and Herzegovina had committed acts of genocide. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina 
objected to the connection of the counter-claim to the principal claim, it did not object to the 
Court’s jurisdiction over the counter-claim. In the course of finding the counter-claim admis-
sible, the Court simply noted the lack of any jurisdictional objection.33 Likewise, in the con-
text of a claim by the DRC based upon the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction, the DRC object-
ed to the admissibility of Uganda’s counter-claim on the issue of connectivity, but not with 
respect to jurisdiction.34 The Court noted that the DRC ‘does not deny that Uganda’s claims 
fulfil the “jurisdictional” condition’35 and proceeded to address solely the issue of connectivi-
ty in disposing of the DRC’s objection. 
 22 The applicant might object to the Court’s jurisdiction, but only with respect to 
some aspects of the counter-claim. In Asylum, Peru advanced a counter-claim to the effect 
that Colombia acted unlawfully under the 1928 Convention on Asylum by granting asylum to 
Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. The Court’s jurisdiction over the counter-claim as originally 
formulated was not challenged by Colombia and the Court proceeded based on an assumption 
                                                 
33 Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 243, 
258, para. 32. 
34 Armed Activities case (DRC v. Uganda), Counter-Claims, Order of 29 November 2001, ICJ Reports 
(2001), pp. 660, 666, para. 8. 
35 Ibid., p. 677, para. 30. 
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that jurisdiction existed.36 At the oral hearing in October 1950, however, Peru amended the 
counter-claim to include that ‘the maintenance of the asylum constitutes at the present time a 
violation of’ the 1928 Convention’. Colombia did object to the Court’s jurisdiction over this 
addition, but given the Court’s ultimate disposition of the principal claim in favour of Co-
lombia, the Court found it superfluous to address the jurisdictional objection.37 
 23 The applicant might also object to the Court’s jurisdiction over the entire 
counter-claim. In the Jurisdictional Immunities case, Italy sought to ground the Court’s juris-
diction over the counter-claim upon the 1957 European Convention for the Peaceful Settle-
ment of Disputes. Article 27 (a) of the Convention stated that its provisions did not apply to 
facts or situations arising prior to the Convention’s entry into force. Because Italy’s counter-
claim appeared to concern facts and situations that pre-dated the Convention (harm to Italians 
committed by Nazi Germany between 1943 and 1945, and the waiver of claims contained in 
the 1947 Peace Treaty), Germany maintained that Italy’s counter-claim fell outside the scope 
of the Court’s jurisdiction. Italy sought to argue that its counter-claim actually concerned 
inadequate and incomplete efforts at reparation beginning with two 1961 Settlement Agree-
ments and continuing to recent years. The Court, however, agreed with Germany that such 
later developments were not ‘new’ situations post-dating the entry into force of the Conven-
tion; rather, they simply concerned the existence and scope of a German obligation to make 
reparation for violations that had occurred at a much earlier time.38 Therefore the Court had 
no jurisdiction over the counter-claim and it was inadmissible. 
 24 An interesting temporal question arises if the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction 
                                                 
36 Asylum, Judgment, ICJ Reports (1950), pp. 266, 280. 
37 Ibid., p. 288; see Guyomar, Commentaire, pp. 521 et seq. 
38 Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case, Counter-Claim, Order of 6 July 2010, pp. 9–10, paras. 
26–31. 
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over the principal claim disappears between the time that the case is filed and the time that 
the counter-claim is filed. In Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in 
the Caribbean Sea, Nicaragua filed its application in 2013, invoking as the basis of the 
Court’s jurisdiction the 1948 American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (Pact of Bogotá). Based 
on a denunciation by Colombia, the Pact subsequently terminated as between Nicaragua and 
Colombia. In March 2016, the Court found that it had jurisdiction over the case, since that 
Pact was still in force as of the date that the case was filed. In November 2016, Colombia 
filed counter-claims against Nicaragua. In rejecting Nicaragua’s argument that the Court had 
no jurisdiction over the counter-claims because they were filed after the termination of the 
Pact as between Nicaragua and Colombia, the Court stated that once “the Court has estab-
lished jurisdiction to entertain a case, it has jurisdiction to deal with all its phases; the subse-
quent lapse of the title cannot deprive the Court of its jurisdiction”.39 In this instance, “the 
lapse of the jurisdictional title invoked by an applicant in support of its claims, subsequent to 
the filing of the application, does not deprive the Court of its jurisdiction to entertain counter-
claims filed on the same jurisdictional basis”.40 While generally agreeing with this proposi-
tion, Judge Donoghue wrote separately to argue that the lapse of jurisdictional title necessi-
tated a further inquiry (which the Court did not undertake), which is whether the counter-
claims “fit within the subject-matter” of the dispute presented in Nicaragua’s application (a 
narrower standard than whether the counter-claim was directly connected with the subject-
matter of the principal claim).41       
 25 Article 80, para. 1 of the Rules does not require, by its terms, that the counter-
                                                 
39 Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea, Counter-Claims, 
Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports (2017), para. 67. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid., Sep. Op. Donoghue. 
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claim should have exactly the same jurisdictional basis as that upon which the principal claim 
arises.42 As such, the text arguably leaves open the possibility that, e.g., in a case brought 
based on the Court’s jurisdiction under the compromissory clause of a treaty to interpret one 
provision of that treaty, the counter-claim might be based upon the Court’s jurisdiction to 
interpret a different provision of the same treaty. Further, in theory, the counter-claim might 
be based upon the Court’s jurisdiction under a compromissory clause of an entirely different 
treaty, or upon an entirely different type of jurisdiction, such as invocation of the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction.43 
 26 In the Oil Platforms case, however, there is some suggestion that the jurisdic-
tional basis available for a counter-claim might be limited to the existing jurisdiction over the 
principal claim. In that case, the Court’s jurisdiction over Iran’s claim was restricted by the 
Court, at the jurisdiction phase of the case, solely to the interpretation of Art. X, para. 1, of 
the 1955 US-Iran Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights.44 That para-
graph provides that ‘Between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties there shall be 
freedom of commerce and navigation’, whereas the other paragraphs of Art. X deal with var-
ious rights and privileges of vessels of the two parties. When the United States then filed its 
Counter-Memorial, it included a counter-claim concerning alleged Iranian attacks on ship-
ping in the Persian Gulf, as well as the laying of mines and other military actions, in violation 
of Art. X as a whole, not just para. 1 of that article. Iran objected to the Court’s jurisdiction 
over the counter-claim, asserting in part that the United States ‘seeks to widen the dispute to 
                                                 
42 See Thirlway, Leiden JIL (1999), pp. 203 et seq.; Antonopoulos (2011), pp. 74–80. 
43 Genet, Rev. de droit intern. et de lég. comp. (1938), pp. 161 et seq.; Anzilotti, JDI (1930), pp. 868 
et seq. 
44 Oil Platforms case, supra, fn. 23, Preliminary Objection, ICJ Reports (1996), pp. 803, 821, para. 
55. 
18 
 
provisions of the Treaty of Amity … which were never in question in the proceedings’.45 In 
response, the United States argued that the Court, under the 1978 formulation of the rule, 
should not reach the issue of jurisdiction at the preliminary stage; instead the only matter 
properly at issue under Art. 80 of the Rules was whether there was doubt that the counter-
claim was directly connected to the principal claim. 
 27 In its Order on the counter-claim, the Court did not limit itself to the issue of 
connectivity; it squarely addressed the issue of jurisdiction ‘as such’ over the counter-claim. 
The Court first noted that, in its prior judgment on jurisdiction over Iran’s principal claim, it 
found that Art. X, para. 1, protected not just the immediate sale of goods, but also ancillary 
activities integrally related to such commerce.46 Then, the Court found that the activities at 
issue in the counter-claim ‘are capable of falling within the scope of Article X, paragraph 1’ 
and therefore ‘the Court has jurisdiction to entertain the United States counter-claim in so far 
as the facts alleged may have prejudiced the freedoms guaranteed by Article X, paragraph 
1’.47 In the dispositif, the Court then found that the counter-claim was ‘admissible as such and 
forms part of the current proceedings’.48 
 28 In so doing, the Court may have limited the counter-claim to alleged violations 
arising under only Art. X, para. 1, not Art. X as a whole. If so, however, the Court did not 
explain exactly why the counter-claim was to be so limited, a step criticized by Judge Higgins 
in her separate opinion. According to Higgins: 
In the first place, findings that reject the contentions of a party should be based on rea-
sons. The disturbing tendency to offer conclusions but not reasons is not to be welcomed. 
                                                 
45 Ibid., Counter-Claims, ICJ Reports (1998), pp. 190, 196, para.12. 
46 Ibid., p. 204, para. 35. 
47 Ibid., p. 204, para. 36. 
48 Ibid., p. 206, para. 46 (A). 
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In the second place, the inarticulate assumption that the jurisdictional basis established 
for a claim necessarily is the only jurisdictional basis for, and sets the limits to, a counter-
claim, is open to challenge. 
… 
There is nothing in the Rules or practice of the Court to suggest that the very identical ju-
risdictional nexus must be established by a counter-claimant. The travaux préparatoires 
to the various formulations of what is now Article 80 of the Rules contain no suggestion 
whatever that this was thought of as a requirement. The rule on counter-claims has gone 
through successive changes. But neither in the discussions of 1922, nor of 1934, 1935, 
1936, nor again of 1946, 1968, 1970, 1972, does this thought anywhere appear.49 
… 
Nor does the wording of Article 80, paragraph 1 of the Rules suggest this. It requires that 
a counter-claim ‘comes within the jurisdiction of the Court’, not that it ‘was within the 
jurisdiction established by the Court in respect of the claims of the applicant’.50 
 29 If Judge Higgins’ interpretation of what the Court did is correct, then a coun-
ter-claim that is based upon a legal provision different from that upon which the principal 
claim is based may encounter difficulty, at least in circumstances where the Court has already 
passed upon and limited the scope of the principal claim. Such an approach would no doubt 
be influenced by the second admissibility requirement (discussed later, in 33–56), which is 
that the counter-claim must be directly connected with the subject-matter of the principal 
                                                 
49 Genet, Rev. de droit intern. et de lég. comp. (1938), pp. 145 et seq.; Anzilotti, JDI (1930), pp. 859 
et seq. 
50 Oil Platforms case, supra, fn. 23, Sep. Op. Higgins, ICJ Reports (1998), pp. 217, 218–9. 
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claim. In many instances, the ‘connectivity’ issue may also require a close relationship be-
tween the jurisdiction of the principal claim and the jurisdiction of the counter-claim. 
 30 However, it is not actually clear that the Court limited the US counter-claim to 
Art. X, para. 1 of the 1955 Treaty. During the subsequent merits phase, Iran remained con-
cerned that portions of Art. X other than para. 1 were still part of the counter-claim, and 
hence objected that any portion of the counter-claim based upon those paragraphs should be 
regarded as inadmissible.51 In addressing Iran’s objection the Court, in its 2003 judgment on 
the merits, did not assert that it had decided that the US counter-claim was limited to Art. X, 
para. 1. Instead, the Court noted that the United States itself, in the submissions filed with its 
rejoinder, ‘substantially narrowed the basis of its counter-claim’ by only referring to Art. X, 
para. 1, thereby depriving Iran’s objection ‘of any object’.52 In other words, the Court’s ulti-
mate judgment strongly suggests that the 1998 Order of the Court did not restrict the counter-
claim to Art. X, para. 1; that ‘narrowing’ only happened in March 2001 by the conduct of the 
United States itself when filing its rejoinder. 
 31 In any event, in situations where the Court first finds that the jurisdictional re-
quirement has not been met, it refrains from moving on to the next requirement concerning 
direct connection of the counter-claim with the subject-matter of the claim.53 If the Court 
finds that the jurisdictional requirement has been met, it proceeds to the next requirement. 
 32 Importantly, a finding in favour of jurisdiction for purposes of Art. 80 of the 
Rules does not definitively resolve the Court’s jurisdiction over the counter-claim. The Court 
uses language in its Order to the effect that it has found admissibility under Art. 80 of the 
                                                 
51 See ibid., Merits, ICJ Reports (2003), pp. 161, 209, para. 103. 
52 Ibid., pp. 211–2, paras. 110–1. 
53 See e.g. Jurisdictional Immunities of the State case, Counter-Claim, Order of 6 July 2010, ICJ Re-
port (2010), p. 11, para. 32. 
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Rules ‘as such’,54 by which it appears to mean that, on the facts as pled by the respondent, the 
counter-claim appears to fall within the jurisdiction of the Court. Further, the Court includes 
language that the Order ‘in no way prejudges any question with which the Court would have 
to deal during the remainder of the proceedings’.55 Although the Court has not characterized 
this approach to jurisdiction under Art. 80 of the Rules as a form of prima facie jurisdiction, 
akin to that used in the context of proceedings on interim measures of protection, it would 
appear to operate in much the same way. As discussed later, in MN 75–78, the applicant re-
mains able, as the ‘Merits’ phase of the case unfolds, to revisit the issue of jurisdiction in the 
context of all the facts and law developed during that phase, and to demonstrate to the Court 
that jurisdiction does not actually exist over the counter-claim. 
III. Direct Connection with the Subject-Matter of the Claim 
 33 Paragraph 1 of Art. 80 of the Rules also provides that the counter-claim may 
be entertained only if it ‘is directly connected with the subject-matter of the claim of the other 
party’.56 Art. 80 of the Rules provides no guidance as to how such a connection is to be as-
sessed and application of this requirement appears to be more of an art than a rigid science. 
Indeed, signalling its considerable latitude when applying the requirement, the Court has 
stressed that ‘it is for the Court, in its sole discretion, to assess whether the counter-claim is 
sufficiently connected to the principal claim, taking into account the particular aspects of 
each case’.57 
                                                 
54 See e.g. Armed Activities case (DRC/Uganda), supra, fn. 23, ICJ Reports (2001), pp. 660, 681, 
para. 45. 
55 See e.g. ibid., p. 681, para. 46. 
56 For a historical explanation of the ‘direct-connection’ requirement, see Antonopoulos (2011), pp. 
119 et seq. 
57 Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 243, 
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 34 In the event that no objection is made to the connection of the counter-claim to 
the claim, the Court nevertheless itself examines such connectivity. Thus, in the Land and Mar-
itime Boundary case, Cameroon did not object to Nigeria’s counter-claim, but the Court still 
discussed and determined that a connection existed.58 In that instance, the Court was confronted 
with Cameroon’s claim that Nigeria had unlawfully occupied Cameroon’s territory in the Ba-
kassi Peninsula and with Nigeria’s counter-claims that Cameroon had engaged in unlawful in-
cursions into Nigerian territory along the same land border. The Court determined that Nige-
ria’s counter-claims were ‘directly connected’ since they: 
rest on facts of the same nature as the corresponding claims of Cameroon, and … all of 
those facts are alleged to have occurred along the frontier between the two States; … the 
claims in question of each of the Parties pursue the same legal aim, namely the estab-
lishment of legal responsibility and the determination of the reparation due on this ac-
count … 59 
 35 If the respondent does object due to the lack of a ‘direct connection’ between 
the principal claim and the counter-claim, the Court may readily dismiss that objection, as 
                                                                                                                                                        
258, para. 33; Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area and Construction of 
a Road in Costa Rica along the San Juan River, Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, ICJ Re-
ports (2013), pp. 200, 211-12, para. 32; Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spac-
es in the Caribbean Sea, Counter-Claims, Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports (2017), para. 
22; see also Salerno, RGDIP (1999), pp. 360 et seq.; Kolb, ICJ, pp. 670-3; Quintana, ICJ Litiga-
tion, pp. 814-21. 
58 Land and Maritime Boundary case (Cameroon/Nigeria), supra, fn. 30, ICJ Reports (1999), pp. 983, 
985. 
59 Ibid. 
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occurred in the Asylum case.60 In that case, Colombia’s principal claim concerned Peru’s al-
leged obligation to allow for safe conduct of Víctor Raúl Haya de la Torre. Peru’s counter-
claim alleged that the asylum was not lawful under the Convention. Colombia challenged the 
admissibility of the counter-claim, arguing that it was not directly connected with the subject-
matter of the Application. The Court rejected the objection, stating: 
It emerges clearly from the arguments of the Parties that the second submission of the 
Government of Colombia, which concerns the demand for a safe conduct, rests largely on 
the alleged regularity of the asylum, which is precisely what is disputed by the counter-
claim. The connexion is so direct that certain conditions which are required to exist be-
fore a safe-conduct can be demanded depend precisely on facts which are raised by the 
counter-claim. The direct connexion being thus clearly established, the sole objection to 
the admissibility of the counter-claim in its original form is therefore removed.61 
 36 Yet in other instances, the counter-claim may not be essentially an inescapable 
component or ‘flip side’ of the principal claim, in which case the Court must weigh the two 
Parties’ differing views as to what it is about the two claims that must ‘connect’ and how 
‘direct’ the connection must be. The rule does not indicate whether the assessment of the 
‘connection’ concerns facts, concerns law, or concerns some combination of the two. Issues 
of admissibility before the Court typically depend on facts62 not law, but in its jurisprudence 
on counter-claims, the Court has said that the existence of the ‘direct connection’ must be 
considered ‘both in fact and in law’, and with regard to whether the parties are pursuing the 
same ‘legal aims’.63 
                                                 
60 Guyomar, Commentaire, pp. 521 et seq. 
61 Asylum case, supra, fn. 34, ICJ Reports (1950), pp. 266, 280. 
62 Shaw, Rosenne’s Law and Practice, vol. III, p. 1272; see Salerno, RGDIP (1999), pp. 358 et seq. 
63 Armed Activities case (DRC/Uganda), supra, fn. 23, ICJ Reports (2001), pp. 660, 679, para. 38; see 
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 37 As is the case for understanding the meaning of ‘counter-claim’ (as discussed 
previously in MN 13), the Court does not approach the ‘connection’ requirement as requiring 
that the counter-claim seek to diminish, off-set, or neutralize the principal claim. Some coun-
ter-claims may have that effect, but the lack of that element does not defeat the requisite con-
nection to the principal claim. For example, in the Armed Activities case (DRC/Uganda), the 
Court rejected the DRC’s position that the arguments supporting the counter-claim ‘must 
both support the counter-claim and be pertinent for the purposes of rebutting the principal 
claim’.64 
 38 Further, the factual ‘connection’ or ‘complex’ for comparing the principal 
claim and the counter-claim, as seen in the decisions of the Court, does not require that the 
underlying facts of the two claims be identical.65 Indeed, in most situations, the facts support-
ing the claim and the counter-claim are not the same, but they are related. For the Court, that 
relationship appears to turn upon two key factors: the period of time during which the con-
duct at issue occurred and its geographical location.66 The period of time of the conduct at 
issue in the two claims need not be exactly the same; conduct relating to one claim might 
span a longer time period than the other. The geographical location also need not be exactly 
the same; the conduct at issue in the counter-claim might occur in a place not at issue in the 
                                                                                                                                                        
Genet, Rev. de droit intern. et de lég. comp. (1938), pp. 164 et seq; Antonopoulos (2011), p. 132. 
64 Armed Activities case (DRC/Uganda), supra, fn. 23, ICJ Reports (2001), pp. 660, 679, para. 38. 
65 See Thirlway, Leiden JIL (1999), p. 218. 
66 Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area and Construction of a Road in Cos-
ta Rica along the San Juan River, Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, ICJ Reports (2013), pp. 
200, 213, para. 34; Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea, 
Counter-Claims, Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports (2017), para. 24. 
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principal claim.67 Nevertheless, a relationship in time and space does need to exist. The ‘legal 
connection’ seems to turn on two further factors: the legal and non-legal instruments at issue, 
and the overall objective of addressing a particular legal relationship between the parties.68 In 
most instances, it seems important whether the conventional or customary law at issue with 
respect to both claims is largely or exclusively the same; invocation of an entirely new in-
strument in the counter-claim as having been violated may be a basis for denying a sufficient 
connection of that part of the counter-claim. 
 39 The standard is best understood as applied by the Court in specific cases. In 
the (Bosnian) Genocide case, Bosnia and Herzegovina filed a claim that concerned allega-
tions of wide-ranging conduct in the early 1990s in Bosnia and Herzegovina by Yugoslavia, 
including ‘ethnic cleansing’, summary execution, bombardment of the civilian population, 
destruction of property, and other acts that constituted or related to genocide, all directed at 
Bosnia and Herzegovina’s non-Serb population. In its Counter-Memorial, Yugoslavia ad-
vanced a counter-claim that Bosnia and Herzegovina was responsible in the same time period 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina for comparable acts of genocide, this time directed at Bosnian 
Serbs. Both the claim and counter-claim, therefore, involved conduct in the same place (Bos-
nia and Herzegovina) and in the same time frame (the early 1990s) that allegedly violated the 
                                                 
67 See, e.g., Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea, Coun-
ter-Claims, Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports (2017), para. 36 (finding that two of Colombia’s 
counterclaims “essentially relate to the same geographical area that is the focus of Nicaragua’s princi-
pal claims”). 
68 Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area and Construction of a Road in Cos-
ta Rica along the San Juan River, Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, ICJ Reports (2013), pp. 
200, 213, para. 35; Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Caribbean Sea, 
Counter-Claims, Order of 15 November 2017, ICJ Reports (2017), para. 25. 
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same treaty (the Genocide Convention). 
 40 Bosnia and Herzegovina nevertheless objected to the admissibility of Yugo-
slavia’s counter-claim as not ‘directly connected’ to the principal claim, maintaining that the 
facts at issue in the counter-claim were ‘totally different’ from those of the principal claim, 
and that the examination of one set of facts ‘would be of no help in the judicial analysis of the 
other set and could not affect its outcome in any way whatsoever’.69 Moreover, as a legal 
matter, Bosnia and Herzegovina argued that erga omnes rights at issue in the Genocide Con-
vention are inherently non-reciprocal in nature; there is nothing about the adherence or lack 
of adherence by one Party to the Convention that has any bearing on the obligations of a dif-
ferent Party.70 Bosnia and Herzegovina insisted that connectivity required some element of 
‘countering’ the principal claim by reducing or neutralizing its effects.71 
 41 For its part, Yugoslavia maintained that there was no requirement that the ex-
act same facts be at issue.72 Further, Yugoslavia noted that both claims were based upon the 
same treaty and the same general rules of state responsibility, and that the facts of both con-
cerned ‘the same tragic conflict, i.e., civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which happened in 
a single territorial and temporal setting, based on the same historical background and within 
the framework of the same political development’.73 Moreover, Yugoslavia maintained that 
                                                 
69 Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 243, 
252, para.11. 
70 Ibid., pp. 252–3, para. 12; see Lopes Pegna, EJIL (1998), pp. 733 et seq.; Salerno, RGDIP (1999), 
pp. 352 et seq. 
71 Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 243, 
252, paras. 13–4. 
72 Ibid., p. 256, para. 23. 
73 Ibid., p. 254, paras. 17–8. 
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analysing the facts of the counter-claim was ‘of crucial importance to answer the question of 
attribution to the Respondents of acts alleged by the Applicant’, since in some instances the 
identical facts were at issue with respect to allegations arising under both claims.74 Finally, 
since a violation of the Convention involved assessing the intent of the underlying conduct, 
Yugoslavia argued that understanding the facts associated with the counter-claim was essen-
tial for understanding Yugoslavia’s intent in taking certain actions at certain times.75 
 42 The Court rejected Bosnia and Herzegovina’s position and found the ‘direct 
connection’ requirement to have been met. With respect to the facts, the Court stated: 
in the present case, it emerges from the Parties’ submissions that their respective claims 
rest on facts of the same nature; … they form part of the same factual complex since all 
those facts are alleged to have occurred on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
during the same time period; and … Yugoslavia states, moreover, that it intends to rely 
on certain identical facts in order to refute the allegations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
to obtain judgment against that State.76 
 43 Hence, the concept of a ‘factual complex’ appears fairly broad in nature, capa-
ble of encompassing alleged conduct by one State against another State’s nationals in that 
other State (here, the principal claim) and alleged conduct by that other State in its own terri-
tory against its own nationals (here the counter-claim). 
 44 With respect to the law, the Court in the (Bosnian) Genocide case accepted 
that the erga omnes obligations at issue meant that one party’s breach could not possibly ex-
cuse that of the other party, but even so: 
                                                 
74 Ibid., pp. 254–5, paras. 19–20. 
75 Ibid., p. 255, para. 21. 
76 Ibid., p. 258, para. 34. 
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the absence of reciprocity in the scheme of the Convention is not determinative as re-
gards the assessment of whether there is a legal connection between the principal claim 
and the counter-claim, in so far the two Parties pursue, with their respective claims, the 
same legal aim, namely the establishment of legal responsibility for violations of the 
Genocide Convention.77 
 45 The Court also noted that in its order on interim measures of protection, it had 
called upon both States, not just Yugoslavia, to adhere to their obligations under the Geno-
cide Convention,78 thus suggesting that there was a connection between the conduct of both 
parties with respect to the underlying dispute. When Serbia years later presented a similar set 
of facts in support of its counter-claim against Croatia (albeit this time with respect to the 
Krajina region of Croatia), Croatia did not contest the connection between the counter-claim 
and the claim.79 
 46 The issue of connectivity was also addressed in detail in the Oil Platforms 
case, decided just four months after the (Bosnian) Genocide case. Iran’s principal claim con-
cerned US attacks on three Iranian oil platforms in the Persian Gulf in 1987–1988, in viola-
tion of Art. X, para. 1, of the 1955 US-Iran Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consu-
lar Rights, which provides that ‘Between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties 
                                                 
77 Ibid., p. 258, para. 35. Ad hoc Judge Kreća took issue with calling the applicant’s claim the ‘princi-
pal’ claim, given that the two claims were autonomous and non-hierarchical in nature; he would 
have preferred the terms ‘initial’ or ‘original’ claim. Bosnian Genocide case, Decl. Kreća, ICJ Re-
ports (1997), pp. 262, 262–3, para. 1. The Court, however, has taken to referring to the ‘principal’ 
claim and the ‘counter-claim’. 
78 Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 243, 
258–9, para. 36. 
79 (Croatian) Genocide case, supra, fn. 27, ICJ Reports (2010), pp. 3 et seq. 
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there shall be freedom of commerce and navigation’.80 
 47 The US counter-claim was not focused on the oil platforms but, instead, on 
Iranian small-boat attacks and mine-laying that harmed US and other vessels in the Persian 
Gulf in the same period (the United States alleged that some gunboats were launched from 
Iran’s oil platforms). The United States identified seven specific incidents in 1987–1988 in-
volving such attacks or mine-laying, but reserved the ability to add further incidents as the 
proceedings progressed.81 Iran contended that there was no direct connection between the 
counter-claim and the principal claim. As a factual link, according to Iran, the United States 
did not attack the three oil platforms because of the seven alleged Iranian attacks. As a legal 
link, six of the seven incidents did not involve vessels engaged in commerce or navigation 
‘between’ the two countries (e.g. some of the attacks were against US military vessels), while 
the seventh incident did not involve a US-flagged vessel for which the United States was en-
titled to advance a claim.82 The United States contested those views, but further argued that 
Iran’s attacks generally had an effect on shipping protected by Art. X by creating threatening 
conditions for all merchant vessels operating in the Gulf, and that the US attacks on the plat-
forms in response to Iran’s threatening actions was at the heart of its defence against the prin-
cipal claim.83 
 48 The Court found that the necessary connection existed, stating: 
it emerges from the Parties’ submissions that their claims rest on facts of the same nature; 
… they form part of the same factual complex since the facts relied on—whether involv-
ing the destruction of oil platforms or of ships—are alleged to have occurred in the Gulf 
                                                 
80 Oil Platforms case, supra, fn. 23, Preliminary Objection, ICJ Reports (1996), pp. 803 et seq. 
81 Ibid., ICJ Reports (1998), pp. 190, 192–3, para. 4. 
82 Ibid., pp. 197–8, paras. 16–8. 
83 Ibid., pp. 201–2, paras. 24–5. 
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during the same period; … the United States indicates, moreover, that it intends to rely 
on the same facts and circumstances in order both to refute the allegations of Iran and to 
obtain judgment against that State; and … , with their respective claims, the two Parties 
pursue the same legal aim, namely the establishment of legal responsibility for violations 
of the 1955 Treaty.84 
 49 In the Armed Activities case (DRC/Uganda), the DRC’s claim concerned a se-
ries of alleged acts by Uganda that constituted armed aggression (including incursions into 
and occupation of DRC territory, and support of irregular forces in the DRC), violation of the 
laws of war, and the unlawful downing of a civilian aircraft. Uganda’s counter-claim alleged 
that the DRC had engaged in unlawful acts against Uganda, which the Court approached as 
falling into three categories: (1) alleged DRC acts of aggression against Uganda; (2) alleged 
DRC attacks upon Ugandan diplomatic premises and personnel in the DRC’s capital, Kinsha-
sa, as well as upon Ugandan nationals located there; and (3) alleged DRC violations of the 
Lusaka Agreement of July 1999, which had attempted to end the armed conflict that had bro-
ken out among eight African nations in 1998.85 
 50 With respect to the first category, the Court found that a direct connection ex-
isted. The Court found that the parties’ ‘respective claims relate to facts of the same nature, 
namely the use of force and support allegedly provided to armed groups’, and that temporally 
both claims ‘concern a conflict in existence between the two neighboring States’ since 1994 
(even though Uganda’s counter-claim ranged over a longer period than did the principal 
claim).86 With regard to the legal connection, the Court noted that ‘each Party seeks to estab-
lish the other’s responsibility based on the violation of the principle of the non-use of force’ 
                                                 
84 Ibid., p. 205, para. 38. 
85 Armed Activities case (DRC/Uganda), supra, fn. 23, ICJ Reports (2001), pp. 660, 678, para. 37. 
86 Ibid., p. 679, para. 38. 
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in Art. 2, para. 4 of the UN Charter and in customary international law, as well as the princi-
ple of non-intervention; hence the parties were ‘pursuing the same legal aims’.87 
 51 With respect to the second category, the Court reached a similar conclusion, 
even though the conduct at issue in the counter-claim (attacks on Ugandan diplomatic prem-
ises and personnel, and on non-diplomatic persons in Kinshasa) was not in the same geo-
graphical region as the conduct at issue in the principal claim. Here the Court focused more 
on the temporal dimension of those attacks having allegedly occurred at the same time (Au-
gust 1998) as the alleged Ugandan invasion of the DRC, which therefore placed them in the 
same factual complex88 (the unstated assumption being that the alleged attacks were a re-
sponse to that alleged invasion). Further, the Court noted that both parties were invoking 
rules on state responsibility and on the protection of persons and property, which demonstrat-
ed that they were ‘pursuing the same legal aims’.89 Ad hoc Judge Verhoeven voted against the 
Court’s decision, saying that the alleged attack on the diplomatic persons and property in 
Kinshasa: 
does not appear to me to throw any useful light for the Court on the armed aggression 
and unlawful occupation of part of its territory for which the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo claims to have suffered … . the mere fact that this attack is part of a multifaceted 
history of conflict is not sufficient to justify the Respondent being authorized to seise the 
Court of this claim by way of counter-claim.90 
 52 The Court did not find the requisite connection with respect to the third cate-
gory of Uganda’s counter-claims, since the alleged violation of the Lusaka Agreement con-
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cerned matters of dispute resolution, which was not within the subject-matter of the principal 
claim. According to the Court, this part of Uganda’s counter-claims referred: 
to the Congolese national dialogue, to the deployment of the United Nations Organiza-
tion Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and to the disarma-
ment and demobilization of armed groups … [and] these questions, which relate to meth-
ods for solving the conflict in the region agreed at [a] multilateral level in a ceasefire ac-
cord … , concern facts of a different nature from those relied on in the Congo’s claims, 
which relate to acts for which Uganda was allegedly responsible during that conflict …91 
Hence, the Court found that this part of Uganda’s counter-claim was not part of the ‘factual 
complex’ of the principal claim. Further, this part of the counter-claim concerned an alleged 
violation of legal rules (in the Lusaka Agreement) that were not presented in the DRC’s 
claim, such that the parties were not pursuing the same legal aims with respect to this issue.92 
 53 In Border Area/Construction of a Road, the Court held that two of Nicara-
gua’s counter-claims had no direct connection with Costa Rica’s claims in either fact or law, 
and were therefore inadmissible. Costa Rica’s claims concerned an alleged incursion into, 
occupation of, and use by Nicaragua’s army of Costa Rican territory, specifically concerning 
actions in Isla Portillos and dredging operations on the San Juan River. Nicaragua’s second 
counter-claim asked the Court to declare that it ‘has become the sole sovereign over the area 
formerly occupied by the Bay of San Juan del Norte.’ The Court found that this counter-claim 
was not directly connected to Costa Rica’s claim as a matter of fact (the geographical and 
temporal points of reference were different)93 or as a matter of law (Costa Rica’s claim con-
                                                 
91 Armed Activities case (DRC v. Uganda), supra, fn. 23, ICJ Reports (2001), pp. 660, 680, para. 42. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Border Area/Construction of a Road, Counter-Claims, Order of 18 April 2013, ICJ Reports (2013), 
pp. 200, 212-3, paras. 33-4. 
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cerned breaches of sovereignty, of international environmental law, and of an 1858 treaty, 
while the counter-claim concerned acquisition of sovereignty as a result of circumstances that 
had evolved since 1858).94 Nicaragua’s third counter-claim requested the Court to find that 
Nicaragua had a right to free navigation on a portion of the San Juan River. Although the 
geographical and temporal links here were closer (the claims related to a common river sys-
tem and the right to navigate was allegedly ‘revived’ by Costa Rica’s resistance to Nicara-
gua’s dredging), the Court still found that the facts underpinning the claims and counter-
claim were ‘of a different nature’ and that the legal issues were not directly connected.95 
 54 In Alleged Violations of Sovereign Rights and Maritime Spaces in the Carib-
bean Sea, the Court found no direct connection between two of Colombia’s counter-claims 
due to both facts and law. With respect to facts, Colombia’s counter-claims were focused on 
an alleged failure to protect and preserve the marine environment, particularly through ac-
tions of private Nicaraguan vessels, whereas Nicaragua’s principal claims were based on ac-
tions of Colombia’s Navy in allegedly interfering with and violations of Nicaragua’s sover-
eign rights and jurisdiction in its exclusive economic zone.96 Similarly, with respect to law, 
Colombia’s counter-claims were based on customary international law (and international in-
struments) relating to protection of the environment, whereas Nicaragua’s principal claims 
concerned customary international law of the sea relating to the rights, jurisdiction and duties 
of the coastal State.97 By contrast, a Colombian counter-claim focused on the conduct, rights 
and obligations of Nicaragua’s Navy in Nicaragua’s exclusive economic zone was found di-
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95 Ibid., p. 214, paras. 36-7. 
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rectly connected to the Nicaragua’s principal claims.98 Likewise, the Court found a direct 
connection between a Nicaraguan claim and a Colombian counter-claim that alleged violation 
of sovereign rights through the adoption by the other Party of a domestic legal instrument 
fixing the limits of their respective maritime zones in the same geographical area.99 
 55 If the Court finds there is no direct connection between the counter-claim (or 
portions thereof) and the principal claim, there is no indication in Art. 80 of the Rules as to 
what procedure the Court should then follow. In theory, the Court’s discretion might include 
ordering that the counter-claim will henceforth be treated as a separate case on the Court’s 
docket, though doing so would be an unusually robust exercise of the Court’s discretion. In 
any event, the practice of the Court to date, once it finds no direct connection, has simply 
been to decline to entertain the counter-claim as a part of the case before the Court. 
 56 Doing so leaves the respondent free to initiate an entirely new case before the 
Court against the other State based on the subject-matter of the erstwhile counter-claim. In-
deed, Art. 63 of the 1936 Rules of Court expressly stated as much, saying: ‘Any claim which 
is not directly connected with the subject of the original application must be put forward by 
means of a separate application and may form the subject of distinct proceedings or be joined 
by the Court to the original proceedings.’ To date, however, no State that has advanced a 
counter-claim unsuccessfully has exercised this option. If such a new case were filed, there 
would appear to be two possibilities for how the Court could proceed, as signalled in the 
1936 formulation. The Court could address the two cases in separate proceedings, or could 
formally or informally join the two cases in a single proceeding, pursuant to Art. 47 of the 
Rules of Court. If the latter were to occur, and if the Court determined that it had jurisdiction 
over the new case, then the two claims would proceed in a fashion very similar to what would 
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have otherwise occurred if the counter-claim had been admissible in the first proceeding.100 
IV. Filing the Counter-Claim with the Counter-Memorial 
 57 Paragraph 2 of Art. 80 of the Rules provides that the ‘counter-claim shall be 
made in the Counter-Memorial and shall appear as part of the submissions of that party’.101 
Since Art. 80 of the Rules is located in the portion of the Rules of Court that deals with inci-
dental proceedings, it is generally accepted that the reference here is to the Counter-Memorial 
filed on the merits of the principal claim, not a Counter-Memorial addressed to jurisdiction or 
admissibility. Thus, the expectation is that, after an application is filed, any objections by the 
respondent to jurisdiction or admissibility of the principal claim would first be addressed by 
the Court (a process which is especially likely since those objections must be raised no later 
than three months after the filing of the Memorial, regardless of when the Counter-Memorial 
is scheduled thereafter to be filed). Only if the Court decides against those objections is the 
respondent expected to file its Counter-Memorial on the merits, at which point it must file at 
the same time any counter-claim.102 The rule does not permit filing of the counter-claim at 
either an earlier or later stage in the proceedings nor does it apparently permit the submission 
of a counter-claim orally. Moreover, the rule does not permit the filing of a ‘counter-counter-
claim’ by the applicant, a step not attempted in any case filed to date before the Court. 
 58 In some instances, in the course of filing preliminary objections on jurisdiction 
or admissibility, a respondent has included a reservation to the effect that, if such objections 
are not sustained, the respondent may decide to file a counter-claim at the merits stage. 
Though not required by the Rules of Court, such a reservation is an understandable precau-
tion and, in any event, signals to the Court the intention of the respondent in the event that the 
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case moves forward. 
 59 Once a counter-claim has been filed in conjunction with the Counter-
Memorial and has been found admissible, Art. 80 of the Rules does not address whether it 
should be notified to all States entitled to appear before the Court (as is done when an appli-
cation initiating a case is filed with the Court, pursuant to Art. 40, para. 3 of the Statute of the 
Court).103 In the initial cases involving counter-claims before the International Court (Asylum 
and Rights of US Nationals in Morocco), no such notification appears to have occurred. Nev-
ertheless, since the decision on admissibility of the counter-claim in the (Bosnian) Genocide 
case, a practice has developed whereby the Court instructs the Registrar of the Court to 
transmit a copy of the Court’s Order on admissibility to those States,104 or its Order schedul-
ing further pleadings in the event that admissibility is not challenged.105 Doing so is an ap-
propriate step, inter alia, to ensure that any State that believes it has interests at stake in the 
Court’s adjudication of the counter-claim may seek to intervene in the proceeding, pursuant 
to Arts. 62 or 63 of the Court’s Statute.106 Even so, the Court does not transmit along with its 
Order the portion of the Counter-Memorial advancing the counter-claim, so third States are 
left to assess the nature of the counter-claim from the Court’s Order alone.107 
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V. Counter-Claim as an Independent Claim and Not a Defence 
 60 Once the counter-claim is permitted, the language of Art. 80 of the Rules 
strongly indicates that the counter-claim operates as an independent claim, neither as a de-
fence to the principal claim nor as a claim dependent on the principal claim.108 Both paras. 1 
and 2 of Art. 80 of the Rules refer to the applicant as simply the ‘other party’ to the counter-
claim; it is no longer exclusively the ‘Applicant’ in the proceeding. In the event that the prin-
cipal claim fails on the merits, or is withdrawn, there is no direct effect upon the counter-
claim, which will stand or fall on its own merits. 
 61 In the (Bosnian) Genocide case, the Court confirmed that, although the coun-
ter-claim is a reaction to the principal claim, ‘a counter-claim is independent of the principal 
claim in so far as it constitutes a separate “claim”, that is to say an autonomous legal act the 
object of which is to submit a new claim to the Court’.109 Further, the counter-claim widens 
‘the original subject-matter of the dispute by pursuing objectives other than the mere dismissal 
of the claim of the Applicant in the main proceedings’, and thus is ‘distinguishable from a 
defence on the merits’.110 In the normal course of events, this means that a counter-claim (un-
like a defence) will identify a violation of international law for which the other party is re-
sponsible and will seek reparation from the Court for that violation.111 If it does not serve this 
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function, then it will  not be regarded as a ‘counter-claim.’ Hence, when Yugoslavia filed cer-
tain submissions as part of its counter-claim that related exclusively to dismissal of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’s claims, those submissions were not viewed by the Court as ‘counter-claims’ 
within the meaning of Art. 80 of the Rules.112 Likewise, when Nicaragua filed a counter-claim 
seeking to address a concern about Costa Rica’s compliance with an order on provisional 
measures of protection, the Court viewed such a request as something that could be addressed 
in the normal course of the exercise of its jurisdiction, and therefore did not need to be enter-
tained as a ‘counter-claim.’113 
VI. Other Party’s Right to an Additional Pleading 
 62 Since the counter-claim is an independent claim, para. 2 of Art. 80 of the 
Rules establishes procedural equality as between the two claims, by making clear the right of 
the ‘other party’ (i.e. the applicant) to ‘present its views in writing on the counter-claim, in an 
additional pleading’. Thus, whatever schedule may be set by the Court for addressing the 
merits of the principal claim in the case, which under Art. 45 of the Rules of Court always 
allows the respondent to file the final written pleading on the principal claim, the ‘other par-
ty’ to the counter-claim will then be allowed to file a further written pleading that exclusively 
addresses its final views on the counter-claim. In this way, equal treatment is preserved as 
                                                 
112 Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 
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between the parties with regard to their respective claims.114 
 63 Thus, when the Court decided favourably on the admission of Yugoslavia’s 
counter-claim in the (Bosnian) Genocide case, it stated in its Order that ‘it is necessary more-
over, in order to ensure strict equality between the parties, to reserve the right of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to present its views in writing a second time on the Yugoslav counter-claims, in 
an additional pleading which may be the subject of a subsequent Order’.115 The same lan-
guage was included in its Orders for Oil Platforms,116 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Armed Activities (DRC v. Uganda),117 and (Croatian) Geno-
cide.118 Thereafter, the applicants took advantage of this possibility to file a supplemental 
pleading. For example, in Oil Platforms, Iran filed its ‘Reply and Defence to Counter-Claim’ 
in March 1999 addressing both the US position on the claim and counter-claim; the United 
States filed its rejoinder in March 2001 responding to those arguments; and then Iran filed a 
final ‘Further Response to the United States of America Counter-claim’ in September 2001, 
which related solely to the counter-claim arguments made by the United States in its rejoin-
der. 
 64 Although Art. 80, para. 2 of the Rules addresses only an additional pleading 
‘in writing’, the same approach carries on through to the oral hearing. After the respondent’s 
final oral statement (whether arising in a first or second round of the oral hearing), the ‘other 
party’ is entitled to make an oral statement limited exclusively to its final views on the coun-
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ter-claim. Thus, in Oil Platforms, at the end of the first round of the oral hearing, Iran was 
provided the opportunity to make an oral presentation limited solely to the US counter-claim, 
and was again allowed that opportunity at the very end of the second round.119 
VII. Procedure for Deciding the Admissibility of the Counter-Claim 
 65 Article 80, para. 3 of the Rules provides minimal guidance with respect to the 
procedure for deciding on the admissibility of the counter-claim, but practice has helped to 
indicate the procedures that the Court will likely follow.120 The respondent would normally 
explain, as a part of filing the counter-claim with the Counter-Memorial, why the counter-
claim meets the two admissibility requirements. The President or Vice-President of the Court 
would then ascertain, in a meeting of the parties, whether the applicant has objections to the 
admissibility of the counter-claim. As noted earlier, if there is no objection, the Court must 
still satisfy itself that the two requirements of para. 1 are met, a decision that apparently may 
be reached without receiving any further views from the parties, unless the Court ‘deems 
necessary’ receiving such views per Art. 80, para. 3 of the Rules. 
 66 In cases before the Permanent Court, such as Factory at Chorzów, and in the 
initial cases before the International Court, including the Asylum and Rights of US Nationals 
in Morocco cases, the Court did not dispose of issues concerning the admissibility of the 
counter-claim in a preliminary proceeding. Instead, such issues were folded into the pleadings 
on the merits relating to the principal claim. Conversely, the Court has often disposed of the 
admissibility of the counter-claim at a preliminary stage, pursuant to an order addressing ex-
clusively the admissibility of the counter-claim, whether or not the respondent has objected to 
the admissibility of the counter-claim. Thus, in the Land and Maritime Boundary case, Cam-
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eroon did not object to the admissibility of Nigeria’s counter-claims, but the Court still issued 
an order indicating why the twin requirements of Art. 80 of the Rules had been met. Article 
80, para. 3 of the Rules, however, does not require that the matter be disposed of at a prelimi-
nary stage. 
 67 If there is an objection by the respondent to the admissibility of the counter-
claim, Art. 80, para. 3 of the Rules provides that ‘the court shall take its decision thereon after 
hearing the parties’. Again, the rule does not expressly require that the matter be disposed of 
at a preliminary stage; the issue of admissibility could be addressed as part of the reply and 
rejoinder pleadings filed in relation to the merits of claim and counter-claim. Nevertheless, in 
recent years the Court has instead initiated an incidental proceeding, ordering the applicant to 
comment in writing upon the admissibility of the counter-claim under Art. 80 of the Rules 
and the respondent to react to those views in writing. Doing so has the advantage of deter-
mining at an early stage whether the counter-claim should be included as part of the case. The 
disadvantages are that:  (1) initiation of an incidental proceeding slows down the process of 
dealing with the applicant’s claim; and (2) at such an early stage, it may be difficult to deter-
mine whether the counter-claim is directly connected to the principal claim, since all the rele-
vant facts and law on that claim have not been fully developed through pleadings on the mer-
its. In his separate opinion in Oil Platforms, Judge Oda lamented this approach, which he 
viewed as an unfortunate departure from the Court’s past practice.121 
 68 May the applicant solely object to the jurisdiction of the counter-claim during 
the incidental proceeding, leaving for a later phase a possible objection as to whether the 
counter-claim is ‘directly connected’ to the principal claim? In the Jurisdictional Immunities 
case, Germany immediately objected to the Court’s jurisdiction over Italy’s counter-claim, 
but did ‘not deem it useful at this stage of the proceedings to engage in a legal battle about 
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the links between’ the principal claim and the counter-claim.122 Further, Germany asserted 
that there were other reasons as well that the counter-claim might be inadmissible and that 
‘Germany reserves the right to raise such additional preliminary objections, if need be, at a 
later stage’.123 Italy responded by acknowledging ‘Germany’s right to leave open for now the 
question of the direct connection’, but expressed concern that doing so was not consistent 
with a prompt and efficient disposition of issues that Germany wished to raise.124 Since the 
Court found that it had no jurisdiction over the counter-claim, the Court did not squarely ad-
dress one way or the other whether it is permissible to challenge, in a preliminary phase, only 
the issue of jurisdiction.125 
 69 Article 80, para. 3 of the Rules is not clear as to whether ‘hearing the parties’ 
requires that, whenever an applicant objects, the Court should provide an opportunity for an 
oral hearing.126 Prior to the 1978 version of the rule, there was no language at all addressing 
the issue of ‘hearing’ the parties, referring instead to the Court simply engaging in ‘due ex-
amination’ of the matter. The 1978 version of the Rule stated that ‘in the event of doubt as to 
the connection between’ the claim and counter-claim, ‘the Court shall, after hearing the par-
ties, decide’ the matter. That formulation of the rule applied in the (Bosnian) Genocide case. 
After Yugoslavia’s counter-claim was filed, both parties apparently contemplated, during a 
meeting with the President of the Court, that they would submit written views to the Court on 
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the counter-claims admissibility and then ‘be heard orally on the question’.127 The parties 
then submitted their written views. Thereafter, the Court decided, having received ‘full and 
detailed written observations’, that ‘it does not appear necessary to hear the Parties otherwise 
on the subject’.128 Judge Koroma thought that the Court should have conducted an oral hear-
ing,129 as did ad hoc Judges Lauterpacht130 and Kreća, with the latter asserting that ‘“hearing” 
as a term of procedure before the Court denotes, in the sense of Article 43, paragraph 5, and 
Article 51 of the Statute, oral proceedings before the Court’.131 Their views, however, were 
obviously not persuasive to the Court. 
 70 In Oil Platforms, the 1978 formulation was also at issue. Iran requested an oral 
hearing on its objection to the admissibility of the counter-claim both in its meeting with the 
Court and in its written observations.132 By contrast, the United States argued that no hearing 
was required under Art. 80 of the Rules, or in the context of the circumstances of Iran’s par-
ticular objection, given that there was no ‘doubt’ that the principal claim was connected to the 
counter-claim.133 Again, the Court decided that it was not necessary to hear further from the 
parties by means of an oral hearing.134 Judge Oda, in his separate opinion, questioned the 
propriety of finding a counter-claim admissible without having an oral hearing but, here too, 
                                                 
127 Bosnian Genocide case, Counter-Claims, Order of 17 December 1997, ICJ Reports (1997), pp. 
243, 251, para. 7. 
128 Ibid., p. 256, para. 25; see also Salerno, RGDIP (1999), pp. 370 et seq. 
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his position was not accepted.135 
 71 In 2000, the rule was changed to its present formulation, such that where an 
objection is raised or whenever the Court deems necessary, ‘the Court shall take its decision 
thereon after hearing the parties’. This formulation also does not expressly require an oral 
hearing. In the Jurisdictional Immunities case, the Court received written pleadings from the 
parties with respect to Germany’s objection to the counter-claim and chose to decide the mat-
ter based solely on those pleadings.136 Judge Gaja, sitting as an ad hoc judge appointed by 
Italy, stated in his declaration that the wording introduced in 2000 ‘appears to imply that an 
oral hearing should be held’ and that doing so ‘seems particularly justified when an objection 
relates to jurisdiction, given the impact of a decision on jurisdiction’, including the inability 
to bring the counter-claim as a separate case.137 Similarly, Judge Cançado Trindade, the lone 
dissenter to the Court’s order, asserted that the Court ‘should’ have held an oral hearing, 
though he did not indicate whether doing so was required under Art. 80, para. 3 of the 
Rules.138 Such arguments, however, were not viewed as persuasive by the other judges. As 
such, it appears that the Court does not regard Art. 80, para. 3 of the Rules, even under its 
current formulation, as requiring an oral hearing. Indeed, the Court has not held a hearing in 
any of the cases to date in which the admissibility of a counter-claim has been disputed. 139 
VIII. Withdrawal of the Counter-Claim 
 72 If no objection is made or if any objections are rejected by the Court, then the 
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Court’s review of the counter-claim will proceed to the merits phase, in conjunction with its 
consideration of the merits of the principal claim. Prior to addressing the counter-claim on the 
merits, however, the respondent is free to withdraw the counter-claim with the consent of the 
other party, in the same manner that any claim can be discontinued.140 
 73 For example, in the (Bosnian) Genocide case, the 1997 counter-claims filed by 
Yugoslavia were deemed admissible by the Court. In 2001, however, Yugoslavia notified the 
Court that it wished to withdraw the counter-claims. The Court notified Bosnia and Herze-
govina, which indicated that it had no objection. The Court then allowed the counter-claims 
to be withdrawn.141 In Fisheries case, Norway apparently initially ‘reserved’ a counter-claim 
against the United Kingdom for costs associated with capturing UK vessels that were alleged-
ly wrongfully fishing in Norwegian waters.142 The Court decided the principal claim largely 
in favour of Norway, but without directly addressing the ‘counter-claim’; after the Court 
transmitted its 1951 judgment to Norway, Norway informed the Court that it no longer in-
tended to assert its counter-claim.143 
IX. Further Objections to the Counter-Claim at the Merits Phase 
 74 As indicated earlier, often the counter-claim has been found admissible by the 
Court (the Jurisdictional Immunities case being the primary exception). Unless the counter-
claim is withdrawn, then the Court proceeds to the merits phase, where the parties are ex-
pected to plead to the merits of the counter-claim in conjunction with their pleadings on the 
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merits of the principal claim. 
 75 Even at this ‘Merits’ stage, however, the applicant is capable of challenging 
aspects of jurisdiction and admissibility of the counter-claim other than what was already 
decided in the context of the incidental proceeding under Art. 80 of the Rules. Thus, at the 
merits phase of Oil Platforms, Iran contended that it was entitled to raise any objections to 
the jurisdiction of the Court over, and the admissibility of, the US counter-claim that were not 
decided as a part of the Court’s 1998 order on admissibility under Art. 80 of the Rules. To 
that end, Iran challenged the US counter-claim on the grounds that:  (1) it was not presented 
after the negotiations required under the 1955 Treaty compromissory clause; (2) the United 
States cannot espouse claims on behalf of other States or of non-US entities, whose vessels or 
property were allegedly harmed; (3) the counter-claim extended beyond Art. X, para. 1 of the 
1955 Treaty, the only provision over which the Court found it has jurisdiction; (4) the coun-
ter-claim concerned ‘freedom of navigation’ issues, but the Court’s jurisdiction over the prin-
cipal claim only concerned ‘freedom of commerce’; and (5) the United States could not 
broaden the scope of the counter-claim beyond what was expressly addressed in the submis-
sions to its Counter-Memorial.144 
 76 The United States argued that all issues of jurisdiction and admissibility were 
resolved with the Court’s order on the admissibility of the counter-claim under Art. 80 of the 
Rules. The Court did not accept that position, stating instead: 
The Court considers that it is open to Iran at this stage of the proceedings to raise objec-
tions to the jurisdiction of the Court to entertain the counter-claim or to its admissibility, 
other than those addressed by the Order of 10 March 1998. When in that Order the Court 
ruled on the ‘admissibility’ of the counter-claim, the task of the Court at that stage was 
only to verify whether or not the requirements laid down by Article 80 of the Rules were 
                                                 
144 Oil Platforms case, supra, fn. 23, Judgment, ICJ Reports (2003), pp. 161, 209, para. 103. 
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satisfied, namely, that there was a direct connection of the counter-claim with the sub-
ject-matter of the Iranian claims, and that, to the extent indicated in paragraph 102 above, 
the counter-claim fell within the jurisdiction of the Court. The Order of 10 March 1998 
therefore does not address any other question relating to jurisdiction and admissibility, 
not directly linked to Article 80 of the Rules. This is clear from the terms of the Order, by 
which the Court found that the counter-claim was admissible ‘as such’; and in paragraph 
41 of the Order the Court further stated that: ‘a decision given on the admissibility of a 
counter-claim taking account of the requirements set out in Article 80 of the Rules in no 
way prejudges any question which the Court will be called upon to hear during the re-
mainder of the proceedings’ (ibid., p. 205, para. 41). The Court will therefore proceed to 
address the objections now presented by Iran to its jurisdiction to entertain the counter-
claim and to the admissibility thereof.145 
 77 Thus, the Court’s view is that the decision reached on jurisdiction at the inci-
dental proceedings phase is not a definitive view on the Court’s jurisdiction over the counter-
claim. In the context of the US counter-claim, all the Court had decided in 1998 was that the 
facts pled by the United States ‘were facts capable of falling within the scope of Article X, 
paragraph 1, of the 1955 Treaty’ and ‘that the Court had jurisdiction to entertain the United 
States counter-claim in so far as the facts alleged may have prejudiced the freedoms guaran-
teed by Article X, paragraph 1’.146 Likewise, any issues of admissibility other than the ‘direct 
connection’ of the counter-claim to the claim may be raised at the merits phase. As it turned 
out, in Oil Platforms the Court then proceeded to reject each of Iran’s objections to the 
                                                 
145 Ibid., p. 210, para. 105. 
146 Ibid., p. 208, para. 102, citing Oil Platforms case, supra, fn. 23, ICJ Reports (1998), pp. 190, 204, 
para. 36. 
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Court’s jurisdiction over or the admissibility of the counter-claim.147 
 78 The same situation arose in Armed Activities (DRC/Uganda). At the merits 
phase, the DRC advanced several objections to the Court’s jurisdiction over and the admissi-
bility of Uganda’s counter-claim. The Court permitted those objections, saying that the ‘en-
quiry under Article 80 as to admissibility is only in regard to the question whether a counter-
claim is directly connected with the subject-matter of the principal claim; it is not an over-
arching test of admissibility’.148 That statement is somewhat curious in that the Court’s analy-
sis of Art. 80 of the Rules also concerns whether there is jurisdiction ‘as such’ over the coun-
ter-claim, even in circumstances (such as this case) where no objection was made to jurisdic-
tion in the Art. 80 of the Rules proceeding. In any event, the DRC was permitted to object to 
the admissibility of the counter-claim due to: waiver; the raising of new claims not specified 
in the Counter-Memorial; the inability to advance claims on behalf of non-nationals; and the 
failure to exhaust local remedies. In its judgment on the merits, the Court rejected all of those 
objections and thus found the counter-claims admissible, except that it declared inadmissible 
a portion of Uganda’s counter-claims which concerned ‘acts of maltreatment by [DRC] 
troops of Ugandan nationals not enjoying diplomatic status who were present at Ndjili Inter-
national Airport as they attempted to leave the country’.149 With respect to those individuals, 
the Court found that Uganda had not established the nationality of the individuals so as to 
sustain the ability to bring a counter-claim premised on diplomatic protection of persons.150 
 79 As occurred in both Oil Platforms and Armed Activities (DRC/Uganda), one type 
                                                 
147 Oil Platforms case, supra, fn. 47, ICJ Reports (2003), pp. 190, 210–4, paras. 106–18. 
148 Armed Activities case (DRC/Uganda), supra, fn. 23, Judgment, ICJ Reports (2005), pp. 168, 261, 
para. 273. 
149 Ibid., p. 276, para. 332. 
150 Ibid., p. 276, para. 333. 
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of objection at the merits phase may be that the respondent is expanding the counter-claim be-
yond the scope of what was pled in the Counter-Memorial. In that regard, the Court stated in Oil 
Platforms that the same rule applies to counter-claims as applies to claims. That is, the Court 
will seek to determine whether the new element is ‘a new claim’ or whether it is merely ‘addi-
tional evidence relating to the original claim’, bearing in mind that it ‘is well established in the 
Court’s jurisprudence that the parties to a case cannot in the course of proceedings “transform 
the dispute brought before the Court into a dispute that would be of a different nature”’.151 
Where a ‘new’ counter-claim is being presented at the merits phase beyond what was identified 
in the Counter-Memorial, it appears that the Court will deem such a claim inadmissible. In both 
Oil Platforms and Armed Activities (DRC/Uganda),152 the Court did not view the introduction of 
new elements as transforming the counter-claim in those cases and therefore did not sustain the 
objection on this issue. 
X. Disposition of the Counter-Claim on the Merits 
 80 If the counter-claim survives the initial proceeding under Art. 80 of the Rules 
and then further survives any objections to jurisdiction or admissibility that may arise at the 
merits phase, and is not withdrawn along the way, the Court proceeds to decide the counter-
claim on the merits. In each instance where the Court has done so, it first addresses and dis-
poses of the principal claim before turning to the merits of the counter-claim. Both the claim 
and the counter-claim are then addressed in the same dispositif to the judgment.153 
                                                 
151 Oil Platforms case, supra, fn. 23, ICJ Reports (2003), pp. 161, 213–4, para. 117, citing Certain 
Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru/Australia), Preliminary Objections, ICJ Reports (1992), pp. 240, 
265, para. 63. 
152 Armed Activities case (DRC/Uganda), supra, fn. 23, Judgment, ICJ Reports (2005), pp. 168, 274–
5, paras. 322–7. 
153 Anzilotti, JDI (1930), pp. 876 et seq. 
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 81 In some instances, the counter-claim will be rejected on the merits. Thus, in 
Rights of US Nationals in Morocco, the Court rejected the US submissions relating to the 
unlawfulness of the imposition of certain taxes and rejected the US position that customs au-
thorities, when valuing goods, cannot take into account their value in the local Moroccan 
market, stating that ‘the value of merchandise in the country of origin and its value in the 
local Moroccan market are both elements in the appraisal of its cash wholesale value deliv-
ered at the customhouse’.154 In Land and Maritime Boundary, the Court found that Nigeria 
had failed to prove the facts that would have supported its counter-claim, and further failed to 
establish that the conduct in question was attributable to Cameroon.155 In Oil Platforms, the 
Court found that the United States had failed to prove that the alleged Iranian attacks on ves-
sels in the Persian Gulf violated the ‘freedom of commerce and navigation’ obligations set 
forth in Art. X, para. 1 of the 1955 Treaty.156 
 82 In other cases, the counter-claim may succeed on the merits, but be so closely 
associated with the principal claim that the existence of the counter-claim may not make 
much difference in the case. Thus, in the Asylum case, the Court agreed with the submission 
in Peru’s counter-claim that Colombia’s grant of asylum was not in accordance with the ap-
plicable asylum convention; however, in denying the principal claim by Colombia (seeking to 
exercise a right to grant asylum under that convention), the Court had already essentially 
reached that conclusion.157 
 83 Yet is possible for a counter-claim to succeed and thereby result in a finding 
                                                 
154 Rights of US Nationals in Morocco case, supra, fn. 29, ICJ Reports (1952), pp. 176, 213. 
155 Land and Maritime Boundary case, supra, fn. 30, Judgment, ICJ Reports (2002), pp. 303, 453, 
para. 324. 
156 Oil Platforms case, supra, fn. 23, Judgment, ICJ Reports (2003), pp. 161, 217–8, paras. 121–2. 
157 Asylum, supra, fn. 35, ICJ Reports (1950), pp. 266, 288. 
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that would not otherwise be possible in the absence of the counter-claim. In Armed Activities 
(DRC/Uganda), the Court rejected the first category of Uganda’s counter-claims to the effect 
that the DRC had unlawfully used force against Uganda. The Court upheld, however, much 
of the second category of Uganda’s counter-claims, finding that the DRC attacked the ‘Ugan-
dan Embassy in Kinshasa, maltreated Ugandan diplomats and other individuals on the Em-
bassy premises, maltreated Ugandan diplomats at Ndjili International Airport’, failed to pro-
tect those diplomats, and failed ‘to prevent archives and Ugandan property from being seized 
from the premises of the Ugandan Embassy’, all in violation of the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations of 1961.158 As such, the DRC—the original applicant in the case—was 
found to be under an obligation to make reparation to Uganda for the injury caused.159 
D. Evaluation 
 84 Given the considerable attention in the ICJ Statute and the Rules of the Court 
to the basic procedures for the filing of a claim by one State against another, it is remarkable 
that the Statute is silent on the issue of counter-claims, while the Rules are limited to a single 
article consisting of three short paragraphs. The explanation for such a lack of attention is 
probably threefold. First, though counter-claims have been available to respondents through-
out the life of the PCIJ and ICJ, to date they have been used quite sparingly. If counter-claims 
become a more significant feature of the Court’s caseload, there may be calls for grounding 
the regime of counter-claims in the Statute and in more detailed provisions of the Rules. Sec-
ond, when counter-claims are used by respondents, it is possible to fold them into proceed-
ings that already exist for the claim of the applicant; in other words, the basic procedures 
used for claims are largely used mutatis mutantis for counter-claims, thereby obviating the 
                                                 
158 Armed Activities case (DRC/Uganda), supra, fn. 23, Judgment, ICJ Reports (2005), pp. 168, 282, 
para. 345 (12). 
159 Ibid., para. 345 (13). 
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need to develop detailed rules for the latter. Third, while there may be some areas of uncer-
tainty in Art. 80 of the Rules, the Court through its jurisprudence has provided considerable 
content to the meaning of that article, as discussed previously. As such, the regime of coun-
ter-claims is a good example of how the Court can develop—incrementally and over time—
sensible procedures for handling its docket. 
 85 Overall, the current regime appears well-suited for balancing the interests of 
the applicant and the respondent. The respondent is able to place before the Court its own 
grievances with respect to the applicant’s conduct, but is not able to derail the applicant’s 
claim by presenting matters unrelated to that claim or outside the Court’s jurisdiction. The 
applicant receives full notice of such grievances, is able to contest whether they are truly re-
lated to the applicant’s claim, and otherwise is able to litigate the merits of such grievances 
just as it would if the counter-claim had been brought as a stand-alone case. In none of the 
cases involving counter-claims does it appear that the filing of counter-claims had a perni-
cious effect on the case; rather, in most instances it appears that they allowed the Court to 
receive a broader range of views on a broader range of issues than might otherwise have oc-
curred. 
 86 As such, the real value of the regime of counter-claims is that it advances the 
Court’s role as a central institution for the pacific settlement of disputes. Disputes often arise 
in a context where both sides believe the other has transgressed international legal norms. 
The regime of counter-claims allows the Court to consider both sides of the dispute in a sin-
gle, integrated proceeding, thereby creating the opportunity for the Court to address the dis-
pute in a more holistic fashion. States themselves may be recognizing the value of pursuing 
counter-claims, since many of the cases in which they have been filed date to just the past 20 
years. Given the value to litigants in ‘levelling the playing field’ when they come before the 
Court, counter-claims at the ICJ may continue to feature significantly in the years to come. 
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Annex:  Filing and Disposition of Counter-Claims 1928-2017 
Case Name and Date of Filing of 
Counterclaims 
Date of Order(s) and 
Judgment(s) of the Court 
Counterclaim 
admissible? 
Yes/No 
Counterclaim 
upheld? 
Yes/No 
A. Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice 
 
   
1. Case concerning the Factory 
at Chorzów (Germany v. Po-
land) 
 
Preliminary Counter-
Memorial submitted by the 
Government of Poland on 8 
April 1927 
 
Judgment of 13 Septem-
ber 1928, PCIJ, Series A, 
No. 17, p. 36 
 
Yes No 
2. Diversion of Water from the 
Meuse (Netherlands v. Bel-
gium) 
 
Counter-Memorial submitted 
by the Belgian Government 
on 28 January 1937 
 
Judgment of Judgment of 
28 June 1937, PCIJ, Series 
A/B, No. 70, p. 5 
 
Yes No 
3. Panevezys-Saldutiskis Railway 
(Estonia v. Lithuania) 
 
Preliminary Counter-
Memorial submitted by the 
Lithuanian Government on 15 
March 1938 
 
Judgment of 28 February 
1939, PCIJ, Series A/B, 
No. 76, p. 7 and Series E, 
No. 15, pp. 114-15 (Eng-
lish language version), pp. 
108-109 (French language 
version) 
No N/A 
B. International Court of Justice 
 
   
1. Asylum Case (Colombia v. 
Peru) 
 
Counter-Memorial submitted 
by the Government of the 
Republic of Peru on 21 March 
1950 
 
Judgment of 20 Novem-
ber 1950, ICJ Reports 
(1950), pp. 266, 280-88 
Yes Partly rejected 
and partly up-
held 
2. Fisheries (United Kingdom v. 
Norway) 
 
Counter-Memorial submitted 
by the Government of the 
Kingdom of Norway on 31 Ju-
ly 1950 
 
N/A Withdrawn N/A 
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3. Rights of Nationals of the 
United States of America in 
Morocco (France v. United 
States of America) 
 
Counter-Memorial submitted 
by the Government of the 
United States of America on 
20 December 1951 
 
Judgment of 27 August 
1952, ICJ Reports (1952), 
pp. 176, 203-12 
Yes Partly rejected 
and partly up-
held 
4. Oil Platforms (Islamic Repub-
lic of Iran v. United States of 
America) 
 
Counter-Memorial and Coun-
ter-claim submitted by the 
United States of America on 
23 June 1997 
 
Order of 10 March 1998, 
ICJ Reports (1998), p. 
190; Order of 28 August 
2001, ICJ Reports (2001), 
p. 568; Judgment of 6 
November 2003, ICJ Re-
ports (2003), pp. 161, 
208-18 
Yes No 
5. Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Gen-
ocide (Bosnia and Herze-
govina v. Yugoslavia) 
 
6. Counter-Memorial submitted 
by the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia on 23 July 1997 
Order of 17 December 
1997, ICJ Reports (1997), 
p. 243; Order of 10 Sep-
tember 2001, ICJ Reports 
(2001), p. 572 
Withdrawn 
 
N/A 
7. Land and Maritime Boundary 
between Cameroon and Nige-
ria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: 
Equatorial Guinea interven-
ing) 
 
Counter-Memorial submitted 
by the Federal Republic of Ni-
geria on 21 May 1999 
 
Order of 30 June 1999, 
ICJ Reports (1999), p. 
983; Judgment of 10 Oc-
tober 2002, ICJ Reports 
(2002), pp. 303, 453 
Yes No 
8. Armed Activities on the Terri-
tory of the Congo (Democrat-
ic Republic of the Congo v. 
Uganda) 
 
Counter-Memorial submitted 
by Uganda on 21 April 2001 
 
Order of 29 November 
2001, ICJ Reports (2001), 
p. 660; Order of 29 Janu-
ary 2003, ICJ Reports 
(2003), p. 3; Judgment of 
19 December 2005, ICJ 
Reports (2005), pp. 168, 
259-79 
First and second 
counter-claims: 
Yes 
 
Third counter-
claim: No 
First counter-
claim: No; Sec-
ond counter-
claim: Yes 
9. Application of the Convention 
on the Prevention and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of Gen-
ocide (Croatia v. Serbia) 
 
Judgment of 3 February 
2015, ICJ Reports (2015), 
pp. 3, 59-60, 129-53 
Yes No 
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Counter-Memorial submitted 
by Serbia on 1 December 
2009 
 
10. Jurisdictional Immunities of 
the State (Germany v. Italy: 
Greece intervening) 
 
Counter-Memorial submitted 
by Italy on 22 December 2009 
 
Order of 6 July 2010, ICJ 
Reports (2010), p. 310 
No N/A 
11. Certain Activities carried out 
by Nicaragua in the Border 
Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua) 
 
Counter-Memorial submitted 
by Nicaragua on 6 August 
2012 
 
(case joined with Construc-
tion of a Road in Costa Rica 
(Nicaragua v. Costa Rica) on 
17 April 2013) 
Order of 18 April 2013, 
ICJ Reports (2013), p. 200  
First counter-
claim: subsumed 
after joinder of 
proceedings; 
 
Second and third 
counter-claims: 
No 
 
Fourth counter-
claim: no need to 
entertain 
N/A 
12. Alleged Violations of Sover-
eign Rights and Maritime 
Spaces in the Caribbean Sea 
(Nicaragua v. Colombia) 
 
Counter-Memorial submitted 
by Colombia by 17 November 
2016 
 
Order of 15 November 
2017 
First and second 
counter-claims: 
No 
 
Third and fourth 
counter-claims: 
Yes 
Not decided as 
of 2017 
 
 
